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Title

Gendered disinformation in elections: Lessons from Africa
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Description

Gendered disinformation, according to the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression (report A/78/288), is when false or misleading information is deliberately spread to target women and gender-nonconforming people. It goes beyond just spreading lies; it is often used to silence them, damage their reputation, push them out of public life, and put them at risk of harm. The UN report also explains that this kind of disinformation is a form of online gender-based violence. It can affect people’s safety, health and ability to take part in public debate, while also limiting their right to freely express themselves.These issues were discussed in a panel hosted by the Association for Progressive Communications (APC) during the Digital Rights and Inclusion Forum (DRIF 2026), where speakers drew on experiences from Cameroon, Tanzania and Uganda to show how attacks based on gender, political divisions and fast-moving online misinformation are changing the way elections play out. The discussion made it clear that women are often affected more heavily, both in terms of their participation in politics and the fairness of elections. At the same time, the panel looked at how these challenges relate to freedom of expression online. Participants also shared different ways of responding, including policy changes, technology tools and efforts by civil society, all aimed at making online spaces safer and more fair while still protecting people’s right to speak freely.Understanding gendered disinformation in electoral contextsOn 14 April 2026, the DRIF 2026 session “Gender Disinformation in the Context of Elections: Learnings from Cameroon, Tanzania and Uganda” brought together practitioners and civil society actors from across Africa and regional partners including organisations such as PROTEGE QV, Women of Uganda Network (WOUGNET), Pollicy, Centre for Multilateral Affairs (CfMA), Zaina Foundation and APC to reflect on lived experiences, research findings and advocacy efforts addressing gendered disinformation in electoral contexts.Gendered disinformation is more than just false stories about women; it’s often deliberate. It leans on existing stereotypes and biases to question women’s credibility, especially during elections, when visibility matters most. And sadly, gendered disinformation has emerged as a critical and systemic threat to democratic participation, targeting the spread of false stories about women. It hits women politicians, journalists, human rights defenders and public officials especially hard. The aim is usually the same: to discredit, intimidate or silence. Over time, this creates a chilling effect: women hold back, speak less, or step away altogether. That’s why gendered disinformation isn’t just an online issue. It directly affects who participates, who is heard, and ultimately, how inclusive our democracies really are.As Peace Oliver Amuge from APC put it, it sits right at the intersection of free speech, human rights, election integrity and how platforms operate. In other words, it’s part of a bigger system. And today, that system is largely digital. Elections are no longer just about rallies and voting day; they're shaped online, in fast-moving spaces where information spreads quickly and isn’t always verified. That’s where gendered narratives thrive. They tap into familiar cultural assumptions, turning things like a woman’s appearance or personal life into political attacks, instead of focusing on her ideas or leadership. As part of bigger, systemic issues, these narratives undermine free speech, distort voting processes, erode trust in institutions, and even fuel violence against women both online and offline.The panel emphasised that tackling gendered disinformation isn’t just about reacting after the damage is done. Civil society is actively researching, raising awareness, pushing for better policies, and exploring new tech solutions to platform accountability. The panel positioned gendered disinformation as a challenge that affects democracy and human rights, one that needs teamwork and collaboration across sectors.The reflections from this session underscore a clear message: protecting electoral integrity in Africa today means protecting the integrity of information itself, especially in relation to gender, power and participation in digital spaces.Elections in Africa and the role of digital platformsA common thread emerged in elections across Africa: they are heavily influenced by political polarisation, coordinated disinformation campaigns, and gender-targeted attacks. During elections, women politicians, journalists, opinion leaders and human rights defenders face increased sexualised narratives, reputational smears and coordinated efforts to silence them.During the October 2025 elections in Cameroon and Tanzania and Uganda’s January 2026 elections, platforms like WhatsApp, TikTok, X (formerly Twitter), YouTube and other Meta-owned spaces played a central role in how information circulated. Campaigns unfolded digitally, voters mobilised through online engagement, and public debate took place in real time across screens. But alongside these opportunities came new risks.Drawing from monitoring efforts under the Digital Rights and Elections in Africa Monitor (DREAM) project, Emmy Okwir Ogule of the Centre for Multilateral Affairs described how these same platforms quickly became fertile ground for misinformation, disinformation and online harassment. Content spread at lightning speed, with videos, images and messages often moving faster than verification processes could keep up. One example was the circulation of videos showing military tankers patrolling Kampala. Whether current or recycled footage, their repeated appearance fuelled fear and uncertainty among voters, leading to low voter turnouts.In such an environment, truth struggles to keep pace. By the time content is questioned or verified, it has often already influenced perceptions and behaviours.The risks extend beyond misleading content. Platforms become sites of targeted attacks on individuals, journalists, human rights defenders, opposition supporters, election observers and women in public life. Trolling, smear campaigns and coordinated efforts to discredit these voices lead to intimidation and for some, silence. Many choose to withdraw, fearing exposure or harassment. Adding to these challenges is the growing concern over data privacy and surveillance. Political messaging relies increasingly on bulk SMS, targeted outreach and data-driven profiling, often without clear consent or transparency. While digital tools can enhance efficiency, they also raise critical questions about how personal data is collected, used and protected during elections.In Cameroon, gendered disinformation often builds on deep-rooted cultural stereotypes and biases that are amplified during election periods. As shared by Avis Momeni from PROTEGE QV, women in public life are frequently targeted through narratives that question their morality, leadership and place in politics. In response, efforts have focused on training journalists and women in digital spaces to identify, document and counter disinformation. These initiatives emphasise fact checking, media literacy, and the need for stronger policy responses recognising that disinformation is not just a communication issue, but a structural one.In Uganda, the risks extend beyond disinformation into the growing intersection between elections, data and digital surveillance. Emmy Okwir Ogule highlighted concerns around targeted SMS campaigns, unclear consent mechanisms, and limited transparency in how voter data is collected and used.At the same time, electoral processes are becoming increasingly digitised, relying on biometric verification systems, National Identification Number (NIN) integration, and online voter portals. While these systems promise efficiency, they also raise critical questions: Who controls this data? How is it stored? And can it be used beyond its original purpose?These concerns are reinforced by findings from Unwanted Witness, which point to uneven enforcement of data protection laws during the 2026 elections. Their report highlights gaps in accountability and oversight, leaving citizens’ data exposed to potential misuse and weakening trust in the electoral process.On top of this, the rise of AI-generated content such as deepfakes and manipulated videos adds another layer of complexity, making it harder for voters to separate fact from fiction in an already crowded information space. Even when proven false, such content can leave a lasting impression, spreading rapidly and shaping public perception.In Tanzania, the conversation is shaped by platform restrictions and a tense political environment. As shared by Asha Abinallah, internet shutdowns and regulatory controls have significantly limited access to digital platforms, especially during critical political moments.Within this constrained space, women leaders have become prime targets of gendered disinformation, including AI-generated content and coordinated online attacks. At the same time, fear of surveillance and legal repercussions has led many users to withdraw from online engagement altogether.The impact goes beyond individuals. Online attacks often extend into family and social circles, creating wider pressure that discourages participation in both digital and civic spaces. In this way, digital restrictions and gendered disinformation combine to shrink the space for public discourse, particularly for women in leadership.As discussions unfolded, one truth became increasingly clear: elections are no longer confined to polling stations, but rather, they are fundamentally shaped by what happens online. What these experiences reveal is that disinformation is more than just falsehoods. It influences behaviour, whether it’s speaking out, trusting information, or choosing to vote. In today’s digital age, safeguarding electoral integrity goes beyond counting ballots. It’s about protecting the integrity of the information that surrounds them.Gendered harassment and women’s political engagementGender-based harassment isn’t neutral, and it’s rarely subtle. It’s personal, often sexualised, and designed with one purpose: to silence women.As Sandra Aceng from WOUGNET explains, women in politics are often attacked not because of their ideas, but because of their identity. False accusations, smear campaigns and online abuse shift the focus from their work to their personal lives, relationships or appearance. In one instance, a false story about a woman’s private life was even broadcast on national television, showing how easily online lies can spill into the real world.These attacks are not random, they are intentional. The goal is to discredit, distract, and force women out of public life. The impact is serious. Many women, faced with relentless harassment, choose to self-censor, withdraw from online platforms, or step away from politics altogether. Others struggle with emotional and psychological stress, making it even harder for them to stay engaged in public life.But there’s hope. Organisations like WOUGNET are taking action. They’re supporting women leaders, journalists and others by hosting digital safety training sessions and providing practical resources like the “Fighting the Bias” guide to help women recognise and respond to these attacks.The problem, however, is bigger than individual cases. When women are systematically targeted and excluded, it doesn’t just harm them, it weakens the diversity, inclusiveness and legitimacy of our democratic systems.Policy gaps and challengesAs panellists shared their experiences with gendered disinformation across various countries, a deeper structural issue came to light. The rapidly evolving digital landscape has outpaced policy and governance frameworks, leaving a significant gap in effective regulation.Outdated and unevenly enforced laws fail to protect people online, particularly during elections, when they are needed most. Data protection frameworks exist but are often not applied effectively when it matters. Digital platforms, now central to political discourse, operate with limited accountability, especially regarding gendered harm and coordinated disinformation.A lack of transparency around platform functions exacerbates the issue. The algorithms that determine content amplification, visibility and spread are largely opaque, making it difficult to understand why harmful narratives gain traction and how to respond effectively.The problem extends beyond national borders. Disinformation flows freely across countries, but responses remain fragmented. The absence of coordinated regional approaches hinders shared learning, collective action and unified standards. Panellists emphasised that many countries face similar challenges, but there are limited mechanisms for collaboration and knowledge-sharing.Efforts to address disinformation must navigate a delicate balancing act. Protecting people from harm must be weighed against upholding freedom of expression. Calls for stronger platform accountability must be considered alongside concerns about state overreach. Measures aimed at improving digital safety must avoid creating new barriers to access.These tensions are complex and challenging to resolve. However, as the discussion highlighted, they cannot be ignored. Strengthening policy frameworks, improving enforcement, and fostering collaboration across sectors and borders are essential in shaping digital spaces that are open, safe and equitable, especially during elections, when the integrity of information and participation is at stake.Emerging responses and collective effortsAmid these challenges, the conversation was not without hope. Across different countries and organisations, efforts are already underway to respond to gendered disinformation in ways that are both practical and forward-looking.A key area of focus has been capacity building. Organisations such as WOUGNET and PROTEGE QV are investing in training programmes that equip journalists, women in politics and civil society actors with the skills to navigate digital spaces more safely. These initiatives go beyond basic awareness, focusing on digital security, identifying misleading content, and strengthening media literacy tools that are increasingly essential in today’s information environment.At the same time, there is a growing recognition that no single organisation can address this challenge alone. Panellists highlighted the importance of collaborative response mechanisms, where civil society groups work together to flag harmful content, support affected individuals and engage platforms more effectively. These collective efforts are beginning to create stronger pressure for accountability, even within complex and often opaque platform systems. Knowledge sharing has also emerged as a powerful tool, not only for supporting those directly affected by gendered disinformation but also strengthening the broader ecosystem of actors working to counter it.Alongside these practical interventions, momentum is building around policy and advocacy efforts. There are increasing calls for greater transparency in how platforms operate, including independent audits of algorithms to better understand how certain narratives are amplified. Discussions are also emerging around the need to regulate AI-generated content, particularly in electoral contexts, where manipulated media can have far-reaching consequences.A call to actionWhat becomes clear from these reflections is that gendered disinformation is not a peripheral issue; it sits at the heart of democratic integrity. It shapes who participates, whose voices are heard, and how trust in institutions is built or eroded.Addressing it requires a layered and sustained approach. Strengthening legal and policy frameworks is essential, but so too is ensuring that these frameworks are effectively implemented. Platform accountability must go hand in hand with efforts to protect freedom of expression, while regional cooperation can help bridge gaps between countries facing similar challenges. At the same time, continued investment in digital literacy and public awareness will be critical in building resilience against misinformation and disinformation.At its core, the issue is about more than information; it is about power, participation and representation. Protecting women and marginalised voices in digital spaces is not optional; it is fundamental to building democratic systems that are inclusive, credible and fair.Responding to gendered disinformation requires collective responsibility. Policy makers have a role to play in strengthening data protection and electoral frameworks to reflect today’s digital realities.Civil society must continue to document, monitor and advocate, ensuring that these issues remain visible and addressed. Technology platforms need to take greater responsibility for the environments they shape, improving transparency and accountability in how content is managed and amplified. And the media must adopt more gender-responsive approaches to reporting, recognising their influence in shaping public narratives.Building resilient democracies in the digital age depends on ensuring that online spaces are not only open, but also safe, inclusive and equitable, especially for women in politics and other marginalised groups whose voices are too often targeted or silenced.Emmy Okwir Ogule is a research associate at the Centre for Multilateral Affairs (CfMA) in Kampala, where he drives rigorous research on digital governance, global policy and multilateral cooperation. He delivers evidence-based insights that shape critical discussions on internet governance, cybersecurity and digital rights. He was a panel speaker at the APC session on Gender Disinformation in the Context of Elections: Learnings from Cameroon, Tanzania and Uganda during DRIF 2026.
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